Answer:
The Anglo-Americans have retained the characteristics of judicial power which are common to all nations—
They have, however, made it a powerful political organ—How—In what the judicial system of the AngloAmericans differs from that of all other nations—Why the American judges have the right of declaring the
laws to be unconstitutional—How they use this right—Precautions taken by the legislator to prevent its abuse.
Judicial Power In The United States And Its Influence On Political Society.
I have thought it essential to devote a separate chapter to the judicial authorities of the United States, lest
their great political importance should be lessened in the reader's eyes by a merely incidental mention of
them. Confederations have existed in other countries beside America, and republics have not been established
upon the shores of the New World alone; the representative system of government has been adopted in
several States of Europe, but I am not aware that any nation of the globe has hitherto organized a judicial
power on the principle now adopted by the Americans. The judicial organization of the United States is the
institution which a stranger has the greatest difficulty in understanding. He hears the authority of a judge
invoked in the political occurrences of every day, and he naturally concludes that in the United States the
judges are important political functionaries; nevertheless, when he examines the nature of the tribunals, they
offer nothing which is contrary to the usual habits and privileges of those bodies, and the magistrates seem to
him to interfere in public affairs of chance, but by a chance which recurs every day.
When the Parliament of Paris remonstrated, or refused to enregister an edict, or when it summoned a
functionary accused of malversation to its bar, its political influence as a judicial body was clearly visible; but
nothing of the kind is to be seen in the United States. The Americans have retained all the ordinary
characteristics of judicial authority, and have carefully restricted its action to the ordinary circle of its
functions.
The first characteristic of judicial power in all nations is the duty of arbitration. But rights must be contested in
order to warrant the interference of a tribunal; and an action must be brought to obtain the decision of a
judge. As long, therefore, as the law is uncontested, the judicial authority is not called upon to discuss it, and it
may exist without being perceived. When a judge in a given case attacks a law relating to that case, he extends
the circle of his customary duties, without however stepping beyond it; since he is in some measure obliged to
decide upon the law in order to decide the case. But if he pronounces upon a law without resting upon a case,
he clearly steps beyond his sphere, and invades that of the legislative authority.
The second characteristic of judicial power is that it pronounces on special cases, and not upon general
principles. If a judge in deciding a particular point destroys a general principle, by passing a judgment which
tends to reject all the inferences from that principle, and consequently to annul it, he remains within the
ordinary limits of his functions. But if he directly attacks a general principle without having a particular case in
view, he leaves the circle in which all nations have agreed to confine his authority, he assumes a more
important, and perhaps a more useful, influence than that of the magistrate, but he ceases to be a
representative of the judicial power.
The third characteristic of the judicial power is its inability to act unless it is appealed to, or until it has taken
Step-by-step explanation:
some of it