Question

There is a large steel factory next to a private lake owned by a single individual. Pollution from the factory contaminates the lake, reducing the stock of fish and other aquatic animals. The pollution runoff affects only the owner's private lake. The marginal benefit to the steel factory of pollution is M B = 400 − 2 Q MB = 400 - 2Q MB=400−2Q, where Q Q Q is the amount of water pollution in tons. The marginal cost to the lake owner is M C = 3 Q MC = 3Q MC=3Q. Assume that the amount of pollution damage is measurable, benefit and cost curves are known with certainty, and that there are no transaction costs for negotiation. With this information, answer the following questions:______

A. What is the efficient quantity of pollution? Illustrate on a graph.
B. Recall the Coase Theorem, which indicates that the assignment of property rights to one party or the other is irrelevant when determining the efficient allocation of resources. First assume that owner of the lake has the property rights. Calculate the net gains or loses for both the owner and the factory. What is the total net social welfare?
C. Now assume that the steel factory has the pollution rights. Calculate the net gains or loses for both the owner and the factory. What is the total net social welfare?How does this result compare to answer?

Answer 1

1. 80

Step-by-step explanation:

MB = 400-2Q

Mc = 3Q

MB = Mc

= 400-2Q = 3Q

400=5Q

Q= 400/5

Q=8

Check attachment for diagram

3. The lake owner would be paying for the reduction in pollution. Mc = 0. He will be unwilling to make any offer that exceed this amount. The steel company would be unwilling to take anything below $400 since that is what he gets if nothing is produced. The lake owner would suffer a loss since the steel plant would continue production of 80 tons of pollution