Answer:Days after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declared war, and the United States was confronted not only with a war on two fronts in Europe and Asia, but also hostilities and problems of grand strategy on a truly global scale. Savage fighting was taking place far away in the Soviet Union and China that could decisively affect our ability to win the war. But with our full industrial mobilization only beginning and those battlefields so remote, the United States could make little immediate impact on the global situation. In addition, our enemies held the initiative. For the first half of 1942, the Japanese swept from victory to victory across Southeast Asia and the Pacific. On the other side of the world, Britain survived, but had not inflicted a major military defeat on Nazi Germany. Likewise, although the Soviet Union survived to halt the Germans at the gates of Moscow in December 1941, a fierce and renewed German offensive was coming. There were fears that a nightmare scenario might arise if the Germans thrust through the Caucasus region into the Middle East while the Japanese knifed through India, allowing them to link up and control Eurasia from one end to the other.
It is against this historical backdrop that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt faced a decision: How could the United States most decisively deploy its limited military resources to influence the current balance of forces and the ultimate outcome of the war? The Soviets made clear that a cross-channel invasion of northern Europe, as soon as possible, was their expectation. This prescription for ultimate victory was also agreed upon by the top three American military planners: Henry Stimson, George Marshall, and Dwight Eisenhower. “If we’re to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India, and Burma, we’ve got to begin slugging by air at West Europe, to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible,” Eisenhower contended. While in agreement with the American military leaders that a buildup of forces in England was essential to mounting a continental invasion, British military and political leaders were far more cautious and skeptical of the timing of an operation. The political consequences of a premature, failed military invasion would likely be fatal to the Allied cause.
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