Answer:
Tying-the-Knot and Bridezilla-No-More
1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is for Tying-the-Knot to set a low price and Bridezilla-No-More to set a low price.
True
2. Both firms would be worse off if they cooperated and set a high price for their services, instead of using the Nash equilibrium.
False
3. Given Tying-the-Knot grim strategy, if Bridezilla-No-More breaks the cooperative agreement in the first period,
there will be a permanent breakdown in cooperation between the two firms.
Step-by-step explanation:
Playing the grim trigger strategy, Tying-the-Knot cooperates with Bridezilla-No-More in the first round and in the subsequent rounds as long as Bridezilla-No-More does not defect from the agreement. Once Tying-the-Knot finds that Bridezilla-No-More has betrayed the agreement in the previous game, he will then defect forever. Both firms will then lose as they cannot cooperate to achieve higher profits.