Final answer:
The National Security Strategy suggests that traditional nuclear deterrence may not be effective against rogue states. The massive retaliation approach of the Cold War, underpinned by MAD, may not be applicable to leaders not operating under the same logic of self-preservation. States driven by neorealism operate based on mistrust, influencing how they perceive and respond to threats.
Step-by-step explanation:
The National Security Strategy hints at the idea that while traditional forms of deterrence, such as threatening retaliation with nuclear weapons, may have been effective during the Cold War, applying the same logic to "rogue states" might not yield the expected outcomes. During the Eisenhower administration, the United States adopted a massive retaliation policy, where any attack would be met with a formidable nuclear response, effectively creating a Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) scenario to deter the Soviet Union. However, the efficacy of massive retaliation is questionable against leaders who might not be deterred by the conventional logic of self-preservation.
Sovereign states tend to operate based on mistrust and self-interest, often viewing their own security in a vacuum—a concept echoed in neorealism. This perception leads to a security dilemma where states see the actions of others as potential threats, necessitating a strong and clear defense to protect national interests.
In short, the effectiveness of deterrence strategies is highly dependent on the nature of the adversaries and their leaders. Rogue states may not be swayed by traditional deterrence if their decisions are driven by different calculi than those of states during the Cold War.