Final answer:
It is false that G.E. Moore believed it's possible to define all the qualities that constitute absolute goodness, as he proposed that moral properties cannot be reduced to natural properties, leaving 'goodness' as an open question.
Step-by-step explanation:
The claim that according to G.E. Moore, it is possible to pinpoint all the qualities that constitute absolute goodness is false. Moore's open-question argument in his work Principia Ethica challenges the idea that moral properties, like 'goodness', can be reduced to or defined by natural properties. This is known as the naturalistic fallacy. For Moore, goodness is a non-natural property and cannot ultimately be explained by referring to natural properties—any attempt to do so remains circular (i.e., 'good is good') and leaves the question 'Is x good?' open.
Moore's stance is in opposition to ethical naturalism, such as that proposed by Philippa Foot, who suggested that moral values are related to human flourishing, paralleling natural qualities in other living beings. By contrast, Moore posits that 'goodness' can't be fully captured by naturalistic equivalents or analogies. Hence, the idea of pinning down a set of natural qualities to constitute absolute goodness is not aligned with Moore's philosophical perspective.