Final answer:
The fish cannery will adopt the recycling method, and the hiking lodge will pay the fish cannery an amount between $800 and $1,200 per week. This arises from the Coase Theorem, which predicts private bargaining to solve externalities when property rights are assigned, and there are no costs to bargaining.
Step-by-step explanation:
Given that the fish cannery holds the property rights to the lake, including the right to pollute it, the scenario implies a direct application of the Coase Theorem. This theorem suggests that if there are no costs to bargaining and property rights are clearly defined, private parties can negotiate compensation to solve the problem of externalities. In this case, the pollution from the fish cannery affects the profits of the hiking lodge, creating an externality.
In the example provided, if the fish cannery uses the recycling method, it suffers an opportunity cost of $800 per week in terms of foregone profits, as its profit decreases from $3,000 to $2,200. On the other hand, the hiking lodge sees an increase in profit from $2,000 to $3,200, resulting in a net gain of $1,200 per week when the recycling method is employed. Given the Coase Theorem, the two firms can bargain to reach an efficient outcome where the cost of pollution is internalized.
Since the hiking lodge would benefit more from the recycling than it would cost the fish cannery, it should be willing to compensate the fish cannery to motivate them to implement the recycling method. The annual amount that the hiking lodge is willing to pay could range up to $1,200, as it is the additional profit the lodge would earn from the clean water. The fish cannery would require at least $800 to switch methods. Depending on the bargaining skills of the parties, the final compensation could be anywhere between these two values. However, we can conclude that the cannery will switch to the recycling method, and the hiking lodge will likely pay the cannery somewhere between $800 and $1,200 per week.