Final answer:
In a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous products, if Firm A has higher marginal cost than Firm B, Firm A cannot profitably set a price lower than Firm B. Thus, Price A < Price B will not occur. Firm A is likely to generate less revenue and sell a smaller quantity compared to Firm B.
Step-by-step explanation:
When analyzing a Bertrand duopoly with firms competing in a market with a homogeneous product, if Firm A has a strictly higher marginal cost than Firm B, several outcomes could occur. One potential outcome that will not occur is Price A < Price B, because in Bertrand competition, firms compete by undercutting each other's prices. Given Firm A's higher marginal cost, Firm A cannot profitably set a price lower than Firm B. Additionally, we might infer that revenue of Firm A < revenue of Firm B as well as quantity sold by Firm A < quantity sold by Firm B (Qa < Qb), due to Firm B's advantage in setting lower prices because of its lower marginal cost. As for profits, it is not guaranteed that Firm A will have lower profits than Firm B since various strategic and operational factors can influence profits aside from marginal cost and prices.