Final answer:
Harry Frankfurt argues that the specific difference between persons and non-persons is the ability of persons to have second-order desires and volitions, a characteristic that enables reflective self-evaluation and moral responsibility.
Step-by-step explanation:
According to Harry Frankfurt, the specific difference between persons and beings that are not persons is primarily related to the structure of will and the capacity for reflective self-evaluation. Frankfurt argues that persons have the ability to form second-order desires, meaning they can desire to have certain desires and can reflect on their desires critically. In contrast, beings that are not persons may have first-order desires (simple wants or needs) but lack the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that would allow them to consider the desirability of their desires. This ability to reflect upon, evaluate, and be motivated by second-order desires is what Frankfurt sees as a key feature distinguishing persons with a will capable of moral responsibility.
For Frankfurt, having a will, in the sense relevant to personhood, means being able to have second-order volitions. A person is not simply at the mercy of their wants, but rather possesses the autonomy to critically assess which desires should translate into action and which should not. This critical self-assessment reflects the essence of personhood in Frankfurt's view, setting persons apart from beings that act only on first-order desires without such self-reflective capacities.
Frankfurt's conception of personhood is tied into broader ethical discussions, particularly those around moral responsibility and agency. It highlights the importance of freedom and choice, concepts central to existential philosophy, where the ability to make choices is principal to one's existence. This distinction between persons and non-persons is foundational in debates about moral consideration, such as those surrounding unborn children or individuals with diminished cognitive capacity.