Final answer:
In his article 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,' Frankfurt presents two main desiderata for an account of freedom: desires aligned with second-order volitions and desires formed through identification.
Step-by-step explanation:
In his article 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,' Harry G. Frankfurt presents two main desiderata, or requirements, for an account of freedom. The first desideratum is that freedom requires a person's desires to be in line with their second-order volitions. This means that a person is only truly free if their desires align with what they want to want.
The second desideratum is that a person's desires must be formed by a process of identification. Frankfurt argues that freedom is not simply about having desires, but about actively endorsing and identifying with those desires. For example, someone is not truly free if their desires are imposed on them by external influences or forces.