Final answer:
Wolf suggests that control by one's deep self is not enough for moral responsibility because social instincts may not provide a strong moral foundation. Nietzsche's emphasis on the will to power questions the moral base of our actions, even when controlled by the deep self. Neuroscience adds that brain structures may automate our responses, challenging the idea of control conferring moral responsibility.
Step-by-step explanation:
Wolf argues that control by one's deep self is not sufficient for moral responsibility. Although the deep self controls habitual convictions and is influenced by rationality and conscience, it's argued that the origin of the moral sense has social instincts like sympathy at its core. These instincts, suggested to have been gained through natural selection, are not seen as adequate for full moral responsibility. This is because if moral values are natural and selected for, one could question the capacity for individuals to act against or beyond these instincts.
Moreover, Nietzsche suggests that all human actions, even those appearing altruistic, are essentially egoistic, driven by the will to power. If this is true, it would mean some degree of control is exerted by the deep self in aligning with these drives, but such control might lack the moral foundation necessary for true moral responsibility. Nietzsche asserts that morality is the impersonal expression of personal emotions, which challenges the notion that control by the deep self, if influenced by these emotions, would confer moral responsibility.
Further considerations involve the role of the divine in morality. If ethics are considered an autonomous realm, not beholden to divine authority, then moral responsibility cannot be ascribed simply by aligning with divine will. Instead, ethical actions must be evaluated within human frameworks of understanding right and wrong. Interventionist notions of God or naturalistic explanations of moral sentiments thus pose a challenge to the sufficiency of deep self control for moral responsibility.
Finally, neuroscience introduces another layer of complexity by exploring how the workings of the brain and our cognitive structures may predetermine our moral choices. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex and mirror neurons could indicate that what feels like control by the deep self may just be the brain's automatic responses. This again complicates the notion of moral responsibility tied to the control by one's deep self.