Question

So let's assume that free will requires the ability to have done the opposite. Suppose we abstract from the world (and from our mind) and can reproduce an event in the same conditions as given including exact time and space (and exact mental states). Also suppose it is an event in which the possibility of doing the opposite is a preference choice, such as choosing between two flavors of ice cream that you like. So the question is the following: When reproducing this event, is there a world in which, for example, we could have chosen another flavor of ice cream? If so, what causes this change? When reproducing this event, is there a world in which, for example, we could have chosen another flavor of ice cream? It's an article of metaphysical presumption, but for most philosophers, intuitions lead to the answer of yes, there is another world. Such a world today is referred to as a 'possible world', and today the language is used widely to denote the domain of discourse in which counterfactuals and hypotheticals exist sometimes with existence being taken not as an abstract object (SEP)but as in physically real such as the modal realisms paused by Lewis and others. It should be noted that one doesn't have to admit possible worlds as anything other than abstract objects, meaning that there are philosophies that would reject the notion that anything other than what did happen could happen in a metaphysical sense, and that the use of language to speculate has no bearing on determining physical reality thusly rejecting mental causation. But certainly, it is an intuitive approach to believe that our choices do determine physical reality. what causes this change? This is simply an extremely open question with no canonical answer. If you accept mental causation, then we do. If you reject mental causation, then our brains do. If you take some muddled and middle approach, our minds and brains do. What is important to know that this is very much an open question in philosophy of mind, because of contemporary philosophies, there are radically different perspectives from those of the eliminative materialists to those of cognitive scientists to those of phenomenologists and existentialists. One's philosophical framework and metaphysical presuppositions strongly determine one's answer to this question, and you'll find less and less agreement the more detailed the response you find. Ultimately, you're going to have to answer this question yourself. There is a significant number of people who reject compatibilism(the idea that determinism and free will is compatible). If compatibilism is false, given a deterministic universe, this would imply that free will doesn't exist. But we don't even need to suppose a deterministic universe to reject the concept of free will. I would argue that the idea of free will is a thoroughly dead concept, that simply doesn't make sense given our modern understanding of reality, causality and the brain. At this point, it's merely a nice idea, that seems important, without any remaining rational grounding. Let's suppose we can reproduce a state of the universe down to the last atom, boson and whatever else. If someone is given a choice and they act differently the second time around, this would imply one of the following: They have some existence outside of the universe. This does little more than introduce something we didn't reproduce (that we also don't have compelling evidence for), rather than actually solving the problem. To address this, we can simply extend the hypothetical to suppose that we also exactly reproduced any existence external to the universe. Their actions have some random element. This may meet the requirements of the problem, but acting randomly does not match what we think of as free will. We certainly wouldn't call a random number generator free. I do not see any other option. Something is either deterministic or random. If it's deterministic, it would be the same every time we reproduce it. If it's random, it's not free. Barring randomness, if we reproduced them exactly, with every desire and thought process that they had at that point in time, and we put them in the exact same situation, they should weigh up the available choices in the same way based on their identical desires, and end up making the same choice.

Certainly! Here's a multiple-choice question (MCQ) based on the concepts discussed:

Question:
In the philosophical discussion about free will, possible worlds, and determinism, which of the following statements aligns with the perspective of compatibilists?

A) Compatibilists argue that free will is incompatible with determinism.

B) Compatibilists reject the existence of possible worlds as abstract objects.

C) Compatibilists redefine free will to be consistent with determinism.

D) Compatibilists assert that random actions are essential for genuine free will.

Answer 1

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. In the philosophical discussion, compatibilists argue that free will is compatible with determinism by redefining free will to be consistent with determinism. They believe that even in a deterministic universe, individuals still have meaningful choices and can be held morally accountable for their actions.

Step-by-step explanation:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (for example, logical, nomological, or theological determinism), physical constraints (ex., chains or imprisonment), social constraints (ex., threat of punishment, censure, or structural constraints), and mental constraints (ex, compulsions, phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions). The principle of free will has religious, legal, ethical, and scientific implications. In the philosophical discussion, compatibilists argue that free will is compatible with determinism by redefining free will to be consistent with determinism. They believe that even in a deterministic universe, individuals still have meaningful choices and can be held morally accountable for their actions.