Question

Dustin Locke argues that assuming that p is rationally permissible rather than engaging in probabilistic reasoning regarding p when it is practically certain. Moral or practical certainty, as understood by Locke, is epistemic in nature, even though it falls short of epistemic certainty. According to Locke, something is practically certain if the actual epistemic probability that p differs from epistemic certainty that p only in ways that are irrelevant to the decision one currently faces. In other words, we are practically certain if the points and extent of our wrongness in assumptions would not make a difference in the outcome of our decision process. This notion of practical certainty acknowledges that, in our decisions, we may be wrong in our assumptions, and it is impractical to demand an absolute certainty that cannot be achieved. As long as the potential wrongness in our assumptions does not impact the decision's outcome, we can consider it practically certain, even if we are wrong strictly speaking. However, this concept of practical certainty does not address the epistemic problem of knowing the actual probabilities of p and whether differences would alter our decision. Therefore, it is ironically impractical because it doesn't resolve the uncertainty in decision processes, which remains an epistemic problem. Locke emphasizes that conceptually, a degree of certainty exists on a continuous scale from zero to one, and there is no fixed point dividing practical certainty from lesser degrees. Practical certainty depends on various factors, including personal judgment. A general principle is considering something practically certain if related uncertainty is deemed purely academic, but defining what one means by 'purely academic' poses its own challenges. Residual uncertainty becomes practically irrelevant if it doesn't make a practical difference. Practical certainty is subjective and can vary depending on circumstances and the question at hand. For instance, the possibility of swimming the English Channel might be practically certain of failure in normal circumstances, but the introduction of extraordinary circumstances, like a billion-pound incentive, could alter one's perception of practical certainty. According to Dustin Locke, when is assuming that p rationally permissible?

a. When it is practically certain.
b. When it is epistemically certain.
c. When it is theoretically certain.
d. When it is probabilistically certain.

Answer 1

Dustin Locke argues that assuming that p is rationally permissible a) when it is practically certain, which means that the points and extent of our wrongness in assumptions would not make a difference in the outcome of our decision process.

Step-by-step explanation:

Dustin Locke argues that assuming that p is rationally permissible rather than engaging in probabilistic reasoning regarding p when it is practically certain. Moral or practical certainty, as understood by Locke, is epistemic in nature, even though it falls short of epistemic certainty.

According to Locke, something is practically certain if the actual epistemic probability that p differs from epistemic certainty that p only in ways that are irrelevant to the decision one currently faces.

In other words, we are practically certain if the points and extent of our wrongness in assumptions would not make a difference in the outcome of our decision process. This notion of practical certainty acknowledges that, in our decisions, we may be wrong in our assumptions, and it is impractical to demand an absolute certainty that cannot be achieved.