Final answer:
The question addresses the challenge of making a clear distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and factual and evaluative statements, considering the objections raised by philosophers such as W.V.O. Quine and Hilary Putnam. These objections demonstrate the blurred lines and interplay between empirical facts and values in our language and understanding of the world. Therefore, finding an unequivocal way to make this distinction is complex and subject to debate.
Step-by-step explanation:
The distinctions between analytic and synthetic propositions and the related concept of the fact-value distinction are significant issues in philosophy, particularly in epistemology and ethics. The question revolves around whether one can definitively segregate factual statements from evaluative ones, a challenge put forth by philosophers like W.V.O. Quine.
Quine's objections suggest that the lines between analytic and synthetic statements are not as clear as previously thought, blending empirical observation with theoretical virtues such as simplicity and coherence. Hilary Putnam's arguments echo similar sentiments, further blurring the lines by demonstrating the evaluative decisions inherent in the scientific process. Moreover, the open-question argument presented by G. E. Moore argues against the naturalistic fallacy, implying that questions of value are intrinsically different from empirical facts.
In everyday language, descriptively stating that a knife is dull effectively communicates its inadequacy, revealing an implied evaluation of the knife's quality based on its function. This supports the idea that the fact-value distinction may be less rigid than traditionally conceived. Thus, any unequivocal division between analytic and synthetic, or facts and values, must withstand such objections that highlight the complex interplay between language, context, and evaluative judgment.