Question

Reductionism in philosophy of mind is the view that mental phenomena, such as thoughts, emotions, and consciousness, can be reduced to, or explained solely in terms of, the physical or neurobiological processes which are the subjects of neuroscience. Reductionism maintains that such mental events can be explained in terms of physical reactions in the brain, such as the patterns of the firing of neurons and the release of neurotransmitters across synapses. That is contrasted with non-reductionist views that hold that mental phenomena are irreducible and cannot be explained in such terms.

While there's a lot of talk about 'qualia' in this context, I think a more robust defense of non-reductionism can be made in terms of the mechanisms of meaning. Whenever we make an argument for processes being physical in nature, or mental in nature, we constantly invoke comparisons - that such and such is this, or is not that, or is the same as this, or is different to that, or means this, or does not mean that. And I think it's those commonplace instances of the use of inference that can't be explained in terms of neuroscientific analysis, because they are dependent on the intellectual act of abstraction. And abstractions are only perceptible by a mind, as a matter of definition. They're not physical things.

The precursor for this kind of argument goes back to the Phaedo, in the dialogue on the nature of equality. The argument goes that we are only able to say that two things are the same (equal) because we already have an idea of equal - we already know what the meaning of equal is. Socrates famously argues that this is because the soul already possesses the idea of equal and is recalling it, but for our purposes, it suffices to say that the idea of equal, or the ability to recognise equal, is innate. Socrates points out that in real life, no two things are exactly equal - two lengths of wood, or two stones, are not exactly equal, but because we already know the idea of equal, we can say of those two things that they're the same. And much of our comparative and analytical thinking is based on this. In practice, the only time that equality is absolute is in respect of number or symbolic logic - the equals in 2 + 2 = 4 , or in the statement that A = A, is exact, because symbols are defined in precise terms. In real life, the objects we encounter day to day are only amenable to that level of exactitude to the degree to which they can be represented mathematically (whence the extraordinary power of mathematical physics and other quantitative sciences.)

Now I suppose a brain-mind identity theorist might respond that even though an abstraction is not physical, the act of mental representation that stands in for it is. He might say that every instance of such an idea is 'really' just a configuration of neurons or a pattern of excitation. The problem with that is, that there is not even a demonstrable relationship between the symbolic expression of such ideas as 'is not' or 'is equal to' and the meaning they embody. Any such expression can be encoded in any number of symbolic forms or in different languages, while still retaining their meaning; the meaning is separable from the symbolic form. So it seems to me that trying to show that a neural pattern could literally be the same as such an expression doesn't allow for the flexibility that is characteristic of thought and speech. It doesn't allow for abstraction. And furthermore, such an explanation must invoke the very power that it's seeking to explain; you couldn't even get to first base without the ability to make such judgements about what the neural data means. It's not as if you could stand outside the act of judging and see it objectively, without judgement, as then you will have divested it of meaning.

The purpose of this thread is not so much to debate the pros and cons of this argument, as to find out whether it is a recognised line of argument in philosophy of mind and whether there are philosophers who pursue something like this line of argument.

Answer 1

Yes, the argument you presented aligns with a recognized line of reasoning in the philosophy of mind. There are philosophers who advocate for a non-reductionist perspective based on the challenges posed by the mechanisms of meaning, inference, and abstraction that cannot be adequately explained solely through neuroscientific analysis.

Step-by-step explanation:

The argument you've outlined reflects a well-established contention within the philosophy of mind. It challenges reductionist viewpoints by emphasizing the inadequacy of neuroscientific explanations in addressing the mechanisms of meaning and abstraction. The act of comparison, inference, and abstraction, essential to human cognition, cannot be reduced to mere neural patterns or configurations. This perspective highlights the inherent limitations of a purely physical or neurobiological approach in accounting for the richness and flexibility of human thought processes.

Moreover, the example drawn from Plato's Phaedo regarding the nature of equality underscores the inherent abstract nature of concepts like equality, which are not directly reducible to physical manifestations. This serves as an illustration of how certain mental phenomena, specifically abstract concepts, transcend mere physicality, indicating the limitations of attempting to equate them solely with neurobiological processes. The argument ultimately emphasizes that while brain-mind identity theorists might claim neural configurations correspond to mental representations, the complexities of meaning and abstraction persist beyond a reductionist explanation, urging for a more comprehensive approach to understanding the mind.