Question

The classical identity theory holds that each token mental state (in a particular person’s mind at a particular time) is identical with a token brain state (in that person’s brain at that time). A stronger materialism holds, instead, that each type of mental state is identical with a type of brain state. But materialism does not fit comfortably with phenomenology. For it is not obvious how conscious mental states as we experience them—sensations, thoughts, emotions—can simply be the complex neural states that somehow subserve or implement them. If mental states and neural states are simply identical, in token or in type, where in our scientific theory of mind does the phenomenology occur—is it not simply replaced by neuroscience? And yet experience is part of what is to be explained by neuroscience.

Answer 1

The question involves the conflict between materialist and dualist views in philosophy of mind. Materialism asserts all mental states as brain states, while dualism posits a non-physical mind distinct from the brain. The mind-body problem explores how subjective experiences relate to physical brain states.

Step-by-step explanation:

Materialism, Dualism, and the Philosophy of Mind

The student's question addresses a core issue in the philosophy of mind: how to reconcile the subjective experience of consciousness (phenomenology) with the physicalist or materialist view that all mental states are identical to brain states. Materialism posits that only material substance exists, thereby dismissing the existence of any non-physical mind or spirit. As per monism-materialism, this view claims that there exists only one type of substance which is matter. However, this view clashes with dualist perspectives, like that of René Descartes, who believed that mind and matter are two distinct substances (dualism). The mind-body problem is a central issue in understanding the relationship between consciousness and the physical brain.

Dualists maintain that there is evidence for the existence of a non-physical mind, based on the functioning of the brain which cannot be fully described by neuroscience alone. On the other hand, behaviorism and some strands of neuroscience claim that all aspects attributed to a non-physical mind can be explained in terms of brain activity. The philosophy of mind seeks to understand how these mental states and conscious experiences arise from neural processes and the potential implications for our understanding of self, personal identity, and consciousness.