Question

The author questions the distinction made in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy between vague and non-vague propositions, arguing that practically all empirical properties have vague boundaries. Examples are given, such as the vague classification of water based on its salt concentration. The author contends that even seemingly clear categories, when examined closely, reveal vagueness, pointing out that the definition of vagueness may depend on human purposes. The examples provided in response to the author's query include statements like population comparisons or physical properties like density, arguing that precision can be achieved in certain cases. However, the author emphasizes that the potential for vagueness remains, especially when considering real-world scenarios and human judgments. The discussion concludes by acknowledging the inherent normativity and theory-ladenness of language categories, leading to the recognition that categories are tools rather than exact representations of experience. Which of the following statements aligns with the author's argument regarding vagueness in empirical properties?

A. Vagueness only exists in theoretical, not empirical, judgments.

B. Precision can always be achieved in real-world scenarios, eliminating vagueness.

C. The examples provided, such as population comparisons and water classification, demonstrate potential vagueness in empirical judgments.

D. The author suggests that clear boundaries in categories are inherent in human cognition.

Answer 1

The author argues that examples like population comparisons and water classification demonstrate potential vagueness in empirical judgments, emphasizing that even seemingly clear categories can reveal vagueness.

Step-by-step explanation:

The author's argument regarding vagueness in empirical properties is that the examples provided, such as population comparisons and water classification, demonstrate potential vagueness in empirical judgments.

The author contends that even seemingly clear categories, when examined closely, reveal vagueness. The author emphasizes that the definition of vagueness may depend on human purposes and that the potential for vagueness remains, especially when considering real-world scenarios and human judgments.

The discussion concludes by acknowledging that categories are tools rather than exact representations of experience.