Final answer:
The idea that 'ought to be true' equals 'is true' reflects a subjective view on morality in contrast to objective fact, leading to divergences in justifying true knowledge and the role of defeaters. This trivial moral representation is challenged by contextual scrutiny and the flexible nature of truth in narratives and ideals.
Step-by-step explanation:
The notion that 'ought to be true' equals is true can be considered a trivial stage of moral representation when taking into consideration the divergent nature of moral justifications and perceptions of truth. David Hume contended that morality is intertwined with sentiments and not direct factual representations, presenting 'ought' as an expression of subjective approval rather than objective fact. The erroneous conjunction of ought and is overlooks the emotive foundation of moral claims.
Further examination into the legitimacy of beliefs by philosophers such as Lehrer and Paxson reveals that knowledge must surpass merely being a justified true belief, avoiding any potential defeaters which could invalidate the belief's justification. Hence, a trivial assertion that lacks the complexity of real-world conditions and contradicting evidence may seem true within a limited moral framework but fails to stand up to rigorous scrutiny where context and counterevidence are considered.
Moreover, claims within art and narrative often prioritize idealised truth or audience preconceptions over empirical facts, proposing that 'truthfulness' can be flexible when it serves a higher purpose or conforms to popular belief, as indicated by Aristotle's Poetics. In essence, what is oft considered to be a trivial declaration of truth may hold significance in context-relative interpretations, but it may not wield the same force within an objective or holistic understanding of truth and morality.