Question

If there is true indeterminacy in the world, does this imply that each state of affairs is contingent? I am assuming that by contingent, we mean that things could have happened otherwise.

Conceptually, it is not hard to imagine a series of events that are metaphysically necessary and yet may occur without any cause and thus without determination.

Does this imagination imply that you can have an indeterministic series of events that are still necessary? If so, does this still violate the principle of sufficient reason?

Graham Oppy states that a necessary thing can have an explanation for its existence: the explanation being that it is necessary. As such, can the explanation for why an indeterministic series of events exists be that it is necessary?

Answer 1

Indeterminacy in the world does not necessarily imply that each state of affairs is contingent. An indeterministic series of events can be necessary and still align with the principle of sufficient reason.

Step-by-step explanation:

Indeterminacy in the world does not necessarily imply that each state of affairs is contingent. Contingency refers to the possibility that things could have happened otherwise.

However, it is possible to have a series of events that are metaphysically necessary but occur without any cause or determination. This means that an indeterministic series of events can still be necessary.

The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a cause or explanation. For a necessary thing, like an indeterministic series of events, the explanation of its existence can be that it is necessary. So, although it may seem to violate the principle of sufficient reason at first, it actually aligns with it.