Final Answer:
No, assuming philosophical zombies are possible, it is not logically coherent for one zombie to have an inverted spectrum while the rest do not.
Step-by-step explanation:
Philosophical zombies, by definition, are exact physical duplicates of conscious beings that lack subjective experience. The concept of inverted spectrum refers to a hypothetical situation where the qualia of two individuals are reversed, for instance, what appears red to one person appears green to another. If we consider a group of philosophical zombies, their lack of subjective experience implies the absence of qualia, including color perception. Therefore, the question of one zombie having an inverted spectrum while the rest do not is inherently contradictory because the absence of subjective experience precludes any meaningful distinction between their perceptual states.
In the absence of subjective consciousness, the notion of varying qualia becomes irrelevant. If a zombie lacks the capacity for subjective experience, there is no basis for comparing or differentiating their perceptual experiences, let alone introducing the concept of an inverted spectrum. The coherence of inverted spectrum discussions relies on the existence of subjective consciousness and qualia, which philosophical zombies, by definition, lack. Hence, within the framework of philosophical zombies, the idea of one zombie having an inverted spectrum is conceptually nonsensical and incompatible with the foundational premise of these hypothetical entities.