Question

Most people are not experts in physics and will not be able to tell you what Feynman's unique discoveries were but can still say, "Feynman was a famous physicist." If the same person was asked who Gellman was, he could say, "Gellman was a famous physicist too." It is evident that with these two descriptions, nothing distinguishes the two physicists from one another. . . Now consider a case where someone comes along and tells our naive speaker, "Feynman is the man who originated the parton model." Our speaker clearly learned something . . . [which] is not a priori. . . . Kripke's point is that for any description that a person associates with a name, the description is always known empirically, not analytically.

I find this argument to be easily refutable. The description of Feynman that the naive speaker has is, precisely speaking, not "a famous physicist", but "the famous physicist whose name is Feynman." Here, the clause "whose name is N" can be analysed to "whose ID card has N written on it", or "who would turn their head when someone calls N", or an amalgamation of such properties. If the naive speaker was in a room with Feynman and Gellman, they could shout 'Hey Feynman', see which one responds, and realise that the responder is Feynman since he matches the description. Thus, the naive speaker does indeed have definite descriptions.

Is this refutation valid?

Answer 1

The student's refutation regarding the identification of Richard Feynman based on names and responses is not entirely valid. It overlooks that such identification is itself grounded in empirical knowledge, not analytic knowledge. Feynman's major contributions to physics include quantum electrodynamics and Feynman diagrams, which distilled complex particle interactions into a visual and calculable form.

Step-by-step explanation:

The question centers on Saul Kripke's interpretation of how we come to know things empirically versus analytically, particularly about the identification of individuals like physicists Richard Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann. It involves Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions and how they apply to the identification process.

According to the student's argument, calling out "Feynman" and expecting him to respond assigns an empirical element to his name, suggesting that the speaker does indeed have a definite description in the sense that they can identify Feynman empirically rather than analytically.

However, the student overlooks the fact that knowledge of the physicist's response to his name, the association of the name to the person, and recognition that he would turn at being called "Feynman" is itself based on prior empirical knowledge rather than pure analytic knowledge of the person's identity.

Richard Feynman was known for his development of quantum electrodynamics (QED) and the invention of Feynman diagrams, critical tools for visualizing and calculating particle interactions in quantum mechanics. He was also celebrated for his teaching prowess and vibrant character and was recognized with the 1965 Nobel Prize in Physics.

The refutation provided by the student does not sufficiently challenge the distinction between empirical and analytic knowledge as Kripke intended, because the knowledge of who Feynman is (in the scenario given) is still derived from experience or empirical information rather than purely analytic means.