Question

"So physicalists seem to often try to map qualia to something physical but then run into theproblem: Leibniz’s argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon

entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts and
the relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of
perception or consciousness can possibly be deduced from this
conglomerate. I think there is a possible workaround this problem. We map qualia to a physical boundary term. If we think of ourselves thermodynamically and assert our conscious experience is due to the boundary term of our stress energy tensor which enables us to do information processing(telodynamics). Now if I subdivide the boundary term is no longer sufficient to do information processing. This no longer suffers from the orignal problem. Is this argument correct? What is it known as?

Answer 1

The student addresses physicalism in relation to qualia, proposing that consciousness could be explained via boundary terms in thermodynamics. This perspective seeks to avoid Leibniz's critique but may not fully address all complexities of the mind-body problem. The proposed idea is not widely recognized in philosophical discourse.

Step-by-step explanation:

The question concerns the philosophical debate on physicalism versus dualism, specifically addressing the challenge of mapping qualia to physical entities. The student proposes a solution by suggesting that our consciousness and qualia might be explained thermodynamically, relating to the boundary term of our stress-energy tensor that allows for information processing (telodynamics). They argue this could overcome Leibniz's problem, where merely observing the parts and relations within a hypothetical machine representing the mind would not explain perception or consciousness. However, they ask if this solution is valid and what it is known as.

The challenge here is multifaceted and includes both Leibniz's critique of interactionism and deeper questions about the nature of consciousness and the mind-body problem. The argument made does offer a unique perspective but may not completely circumvent the difficulties inherent in the mind-body discussion. In particular, even if one posits a physical basis for consciousness as a boundary term, it may still face objections on how subjective experiences can be fully captured by physical descriptions, which parallels objections to other physicalist proposals.

Psychophysical parallelism, occasionalism, and Leibniz's pre-established harmony are historical responses to the mind-body problem, suggesting either no direct causal interaction between mind and body or intervention by a divine entity for the correlation. Modern physicalism seeks to entirely do away with non-physical explanations. The idea of telodynamics or stress-energy tensor as a solution isn't a standard or widely-known theory in contemporary discussions on the subject.

The student's proposal touches upon debates considering how non-physical entities interact with the physical world, the conservation of energy, the principles of simplicity (Ockam's Razor), and the possibility of mental causation on physical acts.