Final answer:
Even if a skeptic questions the existence of other minds, empathy can be justified as a valuable social practice and for pragmatic reasons. Empathy promotes cooperation and can be grounded in the shared biological and behavioral markers among humans.
Step-by-step explanation:
If one takes the standpoint of a skeptic regarding the existence of other minds, the question arises as to what would justify a skeptic in practicing empathy. While a skeptic might accept that they cannot be certain of other minds like theirs, practicing empathy does not necessarily require certainty. Empathy can be understood as a moral or social practice that enhances cooperation and understanding among individuals, which is beneficial even from a pragmatic standpoint.
Skeptics might argue that even if we are uncertain about the existence of other minds, the similarities in behavior and biological structure suggest a shared experience. Because of these physical similarities, doubt in other minds does not necessarily undermine the potential for empathy. Indeed, it might be considered a common sense approach to interacting with others, akin to G.E. Moore's argument for the existence of external objects by direct perception. Furthermore, applied epistemology and social epistemology look at how groups form beliefs and address testimonial injustice, implying that understanding and valuing others' perspectives is important.
In summary, for a skeptic to practice empathy, it might not require justification on the grounds of certainty of other minds, but rather as a recognition of the practical consequences of social cooperation and the potential harm of testimonial injustice. The skeptic could still find ample reason to engage empathetically with others as part of a functional society.