Final answer:
Separating trivial existence (conceptual) from nontrivial existence (actual) could potentially address debates in Meinongianism and refine Anselm's ontological arguments, considering Kant's criticism that existence is not a predicate.
Step-by-step explanation:
The distinction between existencetrivial and existencenontrivial could indeed impact discussions around Meinongianism and the ontological arguments for the existence of God. Meinongianism acknowledges objects that may have no actual existence but still possess properties. This view complicates ontological arguments like Anselm's, which assert that existence is a property that makes a being greater if it exists both in understanding and in reality. Immanuel Kant critiqued this by stating that existence is not a predicate; the essence of a concept doesn't change by merely asserting its existence.
Anselm, however, believed that by definition, God is a necessary being and thus must exist. Yet, without treating existence as a predicate, such ontological necessity is debated. Therefore, separating trivial existence (existing as a concept only) from nontrivial existence (actual ontological presence) might refine the argument and help avoid conflating conceptual understanding with ontological fact.