Question

Ontological Pluralism: the doctrine that there are different fundamental ways of being.

To put it more specifically to illustrate the point (although this not statement that ontological pluralists are necessarily committed to): the world is made up in such a way that our best metaphysical language will include multiple quantifiers.

Common candidates for ontological pluralist views are objects which are categorically distinct from one another; actual/possible, substance/accident, mental/non-mental, etc.

So, on this view, if we commit ourselves to the existence of actual and possible objects, the distinction between these two kinds of objects is fundamentally a distinction in their modes of existence, NOT their natures or properties. So, on this view, our ideal metaphysical language will include two fundamental quantifiers: actual-exists, possible-exists, which can be written as ∃a and ∃p, respectively (and the same can be done with the universal quantifier).

These quantifiers carve reality at its joints. As such, they are more fundamental than the general quantifiers of standard first order logic (∃ and ∀). I'm not sure if all ontological pluralists are necessarily committed to this view, but for my purposes here it won't really matter. I'm concerned with the metaphysical reality of modes of being. Problems with what language is best used to describe reality can be put to the side. Hopefully, what I've said so far illuminates the view.

The radical distinction between an actual and merely possible coin is grounded in their distinct modes of being (a-existence to the actual coin, p-existence to the possible coin), NOT their natures or their properties.

Okay, time for the argument. Consider the distinction between substance and accidents.

D1. S is a (primary) substance (def =) S is metaphysically capable of independent existence.

D2. A is an accident (def =) A is not metaphysically capable of independent existence but exists, if it exists, in a substance as its modification.

'Metaphysical' = 'broadly logical'

According to D2., an accident cannot exist apart from the very substance of which it is an accident. Therefore, there is a necessary connection between a particular substance S and its particular accident A. The necessary connection cannot be grounded in the nature of A, since natures are multiply realizable - natures must be stated in general terms. It cannot be part of the nature of A that it exists as an accident for this particular substance. Therefore, nothing in the nature of A can specify it to a single substance S. Therefore, the fact that A cannot exist outside of S is grounded in their modes of being (substance-existence, accident-existence, for example), not their natures.

Here's another argument.

Phenomenal states such as pain and pleasure have (as Searle puts it) a ""first-person ontology"". The existence of pain is identically its being perceived. But the existence of a brain is not identically its being perceived. Pain exists in a first-person way, brains in a third-person way. What accounts for this distinction in a particular case of a pain P existing in a brain x? It can't be the nature of P - since natures are multiple realizable. It cannot be that P by its very nature exists in x. Therefore, the ontological dependence of a particular pain P on a particular physical state x is grounded in its mode of being (phenomenal-existence, for example).

What are some ways one might respond to this line of reasoning? Here is one way:"

Answer 1

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being, and our metaphysical language should include multiple quantifiers to account for these different modes of existence. The distinction between substances and accidents, as well as phenomenal states and physical states, is grounded in their respective modes of being rather than their natures or properties.

Step-by-step explanation:

Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different fundamental ways of being. This view suggests that our best metaphysical language includes multiple quantifiers to account for the existence of different types of objects or entities.

For example, if we posit the existence of actual and possible objects, the distinction between them is not based on their natures or properties, but rather on their modes of existence.

This means that our ideal metaphysical language would include quantifiers such as actual-exists (∃a) and possible-exists (∃p), which are more fundamental than the general quantifiers of standard first-order logic (∃ and ∀).

The distinction between a substance and its accidents is also grounded in their modes of being. According to the definition of a substance as metaphysically capable of independent existence, an accident cannot exist apart from the substance it modifies.

This necessary connection between a substance and its accidents cannot be grounded in the nature of the accidents since nature is multiple realizable and stated in general terms.

Therefore, the fact that an accident cannot exist outside of its substance is grounded in its modes of being (substance-existence and accident-existence) rather than its nature.

The same logic applies to the distinction between phenomenal states, such as pain, and physical states, such as the brain. Phenomenal states have a first-person ontology, meaning their existence is identified with their perception.

In contrast, physical states have a third-person ontology, wherein their existence is not identical to perception. The ontological dependence of a particular phenomenal state on a particular physical state is grounded in their modes of being (phenomenal existence and physical existence) rather than the natures of the states.