Final answer:
In the 2020 Philpapers survey, many epistemologists favored nonreliabilist foundationalism, which relies on self-evident truths and internal justification. The popularity of this theory in epistemology, as opposed to other fields, likely relates to epistemological focus on internal coherence over empirical validation.
Step-by-step explanation:
In the 2020 Philpapers survey, many epistemologists favored nonreliabilist foundationalism. This approach to epistemic justification includes theories that rely on basic beliefs—self-evident truths or beliefs that do not require support from other beliefs—as the foundation for all other beliefs. Nonreliabilist foundationalism stresses internal justification, where the conditions for justification are within the mental grasp of the individual, as opposed to externalist views, which consider factors beyond the individual's mental states.
The preference for nonreliabilist foundationalism among epistemologists, but not necessarily among general philosophers or cognitive scientists, may stem from differing focuses. Epistemologists may prioritize internal coherence and the justification processes as primary for knowledge, while others may emphasize external validation and empirical support. The varying disciplinary priorities, methodology, and the nature of inquiry could account for these differences in theoretical preferences.
Moreover, as knowledge acquisition often occurs in a social context, social epistemology expands upon traditional individual-focused theories by examining how groups and societies develop and justify knowledge. Nevertheless, foundationalism has been a significant topic within the ongoing philosophical discourse on justification and knowledge.