Final answer:
The student's question delves into modal logic and the normative aspects of logical reasoning, questioning the construction and interpretation of logical statements, particularly conditionals. It hints at the exploration of non-standard logical connectives or propositional attitudes, pondering the potential for expanding the logical framework to account for broader concepts of truth and possibility.
Step-by-step explanation:
The subject of this complex question touches upon the realms of modal logic, philosophy, and analytical reasoning. At the heart of the question is an exploration into the nuances of logical statements, particularly conditionals, and their relation to notions such as possibility and negation. In a broader sense, the query investigates the structure of logic itself and the normative implications of logical contradictions and possibilities.
Normativity in logic is essential because it suggests that logic prescribes a particular way of reasoning that people ought to follow. As an example, in ethical terms, logic, like ethics, has a normative character because it sets standards or norms for thinking processes. When Lulu states contradictorily that she is both 5 feet and 7 feet tall, she violates a logical standard, specifically the law of noncontradiction, which dictates that contradictory statements cannot both be true.
The connection between various logical forms such as disjunctive syllogism, modus ponens, and modus tollens is central to understanding conditionals and their logical implications. For instance, modus ponens and modus tollens are methods of reasoning which, respectively, affirm or deny a consequence to derive a conclusion. Similarly, logical constructs like conditionals and universal statements are used to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions within a logical framework. Philosophical examples involving the work of Moore and Descartes help illustrate how logical structures like modus tollens can be employed in arguments concerning external world skepticism and the certainty of mathematical truths even in the face of such skepticism.
Ultimately, the question seeks insights into whether there are experiments in logic that use novel terms like '√◊' or '√OB'. While the question acknowledges the syntactic role of logical negations akin to modalities, it appears to propose an exploration into the feasibility of extending traditional logic to accommodate alternative or expanded concepts of truth and possibility.