Final answer:
The is/ought gap indicates a possible reliance on relevance logic within moral discussion. Hume outlined that empirical facts don't imply moral obligations, while G. E. Moore's open-question argument and considerations of telos explore how moral reasoning might be contextualized or directed by goals.
Step-by-step explanation:
The claim of an is/ought gap does indeed suggest a kind of relevance logic, particularly within discussions around morality. The is/ought problem, as articulated by David Hume, highlights a fundamental distinction between descriptive statements (is) and prescriptive or normative statements (ought). Hume's critique is that one cannot logically derive an ought from an is without some additional premises or assumptions; empirical observations about the world do not inherently carry normative weight.
G. E. Moore's open-question argument emphasizes this split by suggesting that moral properties such as 'good' cannot be simply equated with natural properties. To do so would commit the naturalistic fallacy. Inquiry into moral truths remains open-ended because they cannot be conclusively settled by empirical means. Relevance logic, which takes into account the contextual relationships between propositions, may factor into understanding why certain ought claims follow from is situations in moral reasoning, particularly when a goal or purpose (telos) is specified.