Question

Does the liar paradox depend on the admissibility (as meaningful) of, This sentence exemplifies being false?

It seems, for Zalta's comprehension principle, that encoding relations are stipulatively definitional; the liar sentence seems as if it is being defined as false; so it would seem to disambiguate to, This sentence encodes being false, instead of the exemplary report. But, This sentence encodes being false, can exemplify being true just in case that sentence really does encode falsity; so the paradox would evaporate.

I don't really think the encoding/exemplifying distinction is enough to solve the liar paradox just like that. But do considerations like the above testify against the notion of truth-as-a-property in the first place? And if truth isn't a property, then the way the liar sentence is formed (putting truth in predicate, not prosentential, position) seems misguided.

Corollary: we can also ask about, This sentence both encodes and exemplifies being false.

But again, to claim that something exemplifies a property by definition seems perilously close to building a boat to Anselm's paradise, at least if the property in question isn't really a property quite so much at all. (Or: if only concrete particulars can exemplify properties as such, then the liar sentence, given as an abstract sentence-type, is not such as could exemplify properties anyway, but only encode them.)

Answer 1

The relationship between the liar paradox and the admissibility of 'This sentence exemplifies being false' is explored, and it is discussed whether such considerations undermine the notion of truth as a property.

Step-by-step explanation:

The question explores the relationship between the liar paradox and the admissibility of the sentence 'This sentence exemplifies being false.' While Zalta's comprehension principle stipulatively defines encoding relations, it does not entirely solve the liar paradox. However, this does not necessarily undermine the notion of truth as a property but rather calls for a deeper understanding of what truth entails.