Question

How does a physicalist resolve this dilemma (and what is it known as)?

Consider a physicalist who wants to solve the symbol grounding problem. He postulates that a particular brain configuration corresponds to a particular meaning. He gives this postulate the status of a law.

I don't think this solution can work? Why? Let's assume this solution is true. Then by merely knowing what you are experiencing you tell that to a computer in the form of some code. The computer uses an internal dictionary that corresponds to a particular physical configuration.

Essentially the computer has done negligible work to find the configuration of your brain. I don't see why the.computer now cannot ""game' this and violate the second law of thermodynamics.

The situation is analogous to Maxwell's demon but this time the gas is telling him it's state.

How does the physicalist proceed? And what is this argument known as?

Answer 1

The dilemma involves the symbol grounding problem and the potential contradiction with the second law of thermodynamics in a computer analogy. A physicalist might address this by asserting that despite the nuances of consciousness, the interactions between mind and brain are governed by physical laws, possibly nuanced by quantum phenomena, without resorting to non-physical explanations.

Step-by-step explanation:

The dilemma in question relates to the philosophical concepts around mind and body, specifically in the realm of physicalism. The issue at hand is known as the symbol grounding problem, which deals with how meaningful content can arise from purely physical substrates like brain configurations. A physicalist might propose a direct correlation between specific brain states and meanings, elevating this to the status of a law to address this problem.

However, there's an objection based on principles from thermodynamics. The concern is that if a system, such as a computer, could gain direct access to the mental states through a code, it could potentially 'game' the system and violate the second law of thermodynamics—analogous to the thought experiment involving Maxwell's demon. This objection suggests that by simply knowing the brain configuration, a computer should not be able to operate in ways that defy fundamental physical laws.

The physicalist might respond by emphasizing that physical interactions, as they relate to the mind and brain, are bound by physical laws, including those of thermodynamics. They might argue that rather than the mind causing physical actions against these laws, the relationship is more nuanced. Indeed, with the rise of neuroscience and the deeper understanding of cognition, the link between the physical brain states and conscious experiences becomes more evident. This indicates that non-physical entities, if they exist, do not breach the conservation of energy but must interact with the physical through explicable mechanisms, possibly at the quantum level where determinism is not absolute.

The crux of the problem lies in whether non-physical entities like minds can influence physical substances like brains. With the advancements in neuroscience and quantum mechanics, these interactions may be more plausibly explained without resorting to non-physical explanations.