Question

Markus Gabriel proposes a permissive ontology (New Realism) according to, if there exists a certain field of sense in which an entity appears, the entity exists. Even fictional entities like unicorns. On the other hand, inWhy the World Does Not Exist,he tries to show the inconsistency and therefore nonexistence of an all-encompassing world-concept (paradoxes of naive set theory?). As far as I know, Meinong accepted inconsistent (inconceivable) fictional objects like the round square as existing - so why does Markus Gabriel draw the line there? If fields of sense isn't an overly artificial construct, there must be one in which the world appears. That's more natural than a field of sense in which unicorns on the far side of the moon wearing police uniforms appear. His definition of existence is obviously self-referential. I don't know how serious this problem is, but isn't this issue very similar to the supposedly fatally inconsistent infinite nesting that occurs when defining the world as the collection of all existing objects conceived as an object? a. Coherence within conceptual frameworks: Gabriel might prioritize entities' existence based on their coherence within a field of sense or conceptual framework, considering them as existing if they make sense within that context.

b. Limiting the scope of existence: Unlike Meinong, Gabriel might draw the line based on the comprehensibility or meaningfulness of entities within specific conceptual spaces, distinguishing between entities fitting within coherent frameworks and those that don't.

c. Self-reference and circularity: Gabriel's definition of existence might contain elements of self-reference, raising questions about how consistently the concept is applied within his philosophical framework.

d. Challenges in defining all-encompassing concepts: Similar to issues faced when defining the world as the collection of all existing objects, Gabriel's concept might encounter challenges in avoiding paradoxes or inconsistencies, particularly concerning self-referential definitions.

Answer 1

Gabriel's New Realism acknowledges the existence of entities within fields of sense while drawing a line at the all-encompassing world-concept, in line with Kant's notion that existence is not a predicate that can be added to a concept.

Step-by-step explanation:

Markus Gabriel's New Realism posits that entities exist if they appear within a certain field of sense. This principle applies even to entities such as unicorns, which exist in the conceptual realm. However, Gabriel draws a distinction with the concept of an all-encompassing world, challenging the coherence of such a construct on grounds similar to the set-theoretic paradoxes, in line with global skepticism about the external world. Existence within Gabriel's framework is thus distinguished from Meinong's broader acceptance of entities, including inherently contradictory objects like a round square.

In contrast, Immanuel Kant's critique of Anselm's ontological argument underscores that existence is not a predicate that can be attributed to a concept to enhance its definition. This means conceptualizing an entity, such as God or unicorns, does not necessitate its literal existence; our conceptions do not equate to reality. Kant's assertion provides a philosophical backing for Gabriel's demarcation between entities within coherent fields of sense and the world-concept itself, which resists such neat incorporation into a field of sense due to its self-referential nature.