Question

The argument of Companions in guilt is meta-ethics says: Even if there is no rational reason to think to think that something is ethical, that is irrelevant because there is no rational reason to think logically. But I don't understand why this could be meaningful, because even if there is no rational reason to think logically, I cannot imagine how this would this would be an absurd. I don't know why there wouldn't be a rational reason to think logically; maybe I'm conflating the technical sense of "logically" with some other sense. To the extent that I even understand the question, I suspect that the "companions in guilt" problem might be of a piece withan argument from metaepistemology: Whereas Boghossian’s wider objective in defending (a version of) metaepistemological realism was to press back against "postmodern" thinking in the academy, Terence Cuneo’s (2007) defense of metaepistemological realism also comes in the service of a further objective, in Cuneo’s case, a defense of metaethical realism. Cuneo’s master argument is as follows: If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.Epistemic facts exist.So, moral facts exist.If moral facts exist, then moral realism is true.So, moral realism is true (Cuneo 2007: 6) Because Premise (2) is his central focus, Cuneo’s case for metaethical realism largely boils down to a sustained defense of metaepistemological realism (see also here Cuneo & Shafer-Landau 2014). Also, like Boghossian, Cuneo’s case in favor of metaepistemological realism proceeds as a negative case against various forms of metaepistemological anti-realism, including especially error theory and expressivism... Or maybethe normativity of logicis relevant (c.f. the question ofsemantic normativity). A. Explore the connection between metaethics and metaepistemology. B.Discuss Terence Cuneo's argument for metaethical realism. C. Analyze the interplay between moral facts and epistemic facts. D. Consider the relevance of normativity in logic within metaethics.

Answer 1

The argument of Companions in guilt in meta-ethics suggests that even if there is no rational reason to think that something is ethical, it is irrelevant because there is also no rational reason to think logically. The connection between metaethics and metaepistemology is explored through Terence Cuneo's argument for metaethical realism, emphasizing the interplay between moral facts and epistemic facts. Additionally, the relevance of normativity in logic within metaethics, particularly concerning the normativity of logic, is considered.

Step-by-step explanation:

The argument of Companions in guilt within meta-ethics addresses the idea that the absence of a rational reason to believe something is ethical does not necessarily render it irrelevant, drawing parallels with the absence of a rational reason to think logically. The crux lies in the exploration of metaethics and metaepistemology, where Terence Cuneo's argument for metaethical realism becomes pertinent. Cuneo's master argument asserts a connection between moral and epistemic facts, forming the basis for his defense of metaethical realism. This interplay between moral and epistemic facts is crucial in understanding the broader implications of ethical and epistemological realism.

Terence Cuneo's argument is intricately linked to metaepistemological realism, forming a defense against various forms of metaepistemological anti-realism. The alignment of Cuneo's case for metaethical realism with metaepistemological realism underscores the interconnectedness of these philosophical domains. Moreover, the consideration of normativity in logic within metaethics adds another layer to the discussion, raising questions about the normative aspects of logical reasoning and their relevance to ethical considerations. This intersection broadens the scope of the discussion, emphasizing the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of philosophical inquiries into ethics, epistemology, and logic.