Question

Pyrrhonian skeptics are known to (allegedly) suspend judgement on ALL matters, thereby being completely free of all presuppositions.

But could such a skeptic suspend judgment about their own omniscience? Omniscience here being defined as: "The state of knowing everything there is to know."

Given this definition, I'm not sure a pyrrhonian skeptic can actually suspend judgment about their own omniscience. Either:

They actually know everything there is to know, in which case they are omniscient by definition. But a genuine skeptic would be unlikely to make such a claim lest they ceased to be a skeptic.

They do not know everything there is to know, in which case they are not omniscient by definition. But a skeptic would be hard pressed to assert that they lack omniscience, since doing so would require them to judge themselves to be not omniscient. Suspending judgement seems to entail asserting one's own status as not being omniscient.

Answer 1

A Pyrrhonian skeptic would suspend judgment on their own omniscience as claiming to know whether or not they are omniscient would contradict their fundamental principles. Their skepticism aligns with global skepticism and the view that certainty and justification for beliefs are not attainable.

Step-by-step explanation:

The question at hand involves Pyrrhonian skepticism, specifically whether a Pyrrhonian skeptic can suspend judgment regarding their own omniscience. According to Pyrrhonian skepticism, all judgment should be suspended, as they posit that claiming any form of certain knowledge is not justifiable. This form of skepticism pushes the idea that one must refrain from making assertions about reality in order to avoid the risk of error, which entails not claiming omniscience.

In addressing their own omniscience, a Pyrrhonian skeptic would likely argue that to claim either omniscience or the lack thereof would be to claim knowledge that they assert is unattainable. Thus, claiming not to be omniscient would itself be making a certain assertion that goes against their fundamental principles. This skeptical stance aligns with global skepticism, which challenges the possibility of certainty and justification for all beliefs. Therefore, a Pyrrhonian skeptic would, indeed, suspend judgment about their own omniscience, still adhering to their overarching philosophy of suspending all judgment.

With an understanding of Pyrrhonian skepticism, philosophical skepticism, and the nature of knowledge, this suspension of judgment can be seen as a consistent application of their philosophy, which criticizes the assertion of possessing any concrete knowledge, thereby avoiding the paradox of claiming knowledge about one's level of knowledge, including omniscience.