Question

There is an intriguing paper by Easwaran on types of refutations:

Easwaran, Kenny. Rebutting and undercutting in mathematics. Epistemology, 146-162, Philos. Perspect., 29, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2015.

Briefly, rebutting an argument involves showing that its conclusions contradict those reached in other work published in reliable venues, whereas undercutting involves finding gaps in the argument itself.

(We used this distinction for refuting some of Easwaran's own arguments here.)

I did some searches on this site for types/classifications of refutations, without much success. Meanwhile, I am interested in what seems to be a different type of refutation: one that neither contradicts published work, nor goes into analysis of the argument itself, but rather seeks to argue against its coherence from first philosophical principles.

For example, historians and philosophers of math, who sometimes do not have the technical wherewithal to master the methods of Robinson's analysis with infinitesimals, tend to resort to alleged proofs-from-first-principles that nonstandard analysis could not possibly provide a viable interpretation of Leibniz's infinitesimal mathematics.

Has anyone tried to classify rebuttals/undercuttings/refutations with an eye to this particular category?

Answer 1

Refutations in epistemology can take the form of rebuttals, undercuttings, or arguments against coherence from first philosophical principles.

Step-by-step explanation:

In the field of epistemology, refutations can take different forms such as rebuttals, undercuttings, and refutations from first philosophical principles.

Rebutting an argument involves showing that its conclusions contradict those reached in other work published in reliable venues, while undercutting involves finding gaps in the argument itself.

Refutations from first philosophical principles seek to argue against the coherence of an argument by analyzing it in light of foundational philosophical principles.