Final answer:
Foucault suggests Descartes overlooks the experience of madness in his philosophical doubt, while Derrida critiques Foucault's reading of Descartes, arguing for the inherent cogito in the act of doubting. Cartesian Skepticism is contrasted with Freud's psychoanalytic view on dreams, pointing to Descartes' search for indubitable truths.
Step-by-step explanation:
Michel Foucault challenged René Descartes' stance on madness and dreaming, suggesting that Descartes excluded the mad from his doubt framework, as they are incapable of reaching the cogito. Foucault implies that Descartes did not give weight to the experiential insights that can come from madness, which might offer an alternative perspective on reality. Conversely, Jacques Derrida critiqued Foucault's reading of Descartes, arguing that Foucault misinterpreted Descartes by not recognizing that the act of doubting itself already presupposes the existence of the doubter, regardless of their state. Derrida's response takes a linguistic turn, emphasizing the primacy of language and the impossibility of a pre-discursive subject, even in the case of madness or dreaming.
On the topic of Cartesian Skepticism, Descartes put forth the evil demon scenario, where all beliefs could be doubted, but concluded that fundamental truths like those of arithmetic (e.g., 1 + 1 = 2, and the properties of geometric shapes) are indubitable. This aspect marks a distinct difference between the Cartesian approach and Freud's psychoanalytic approach to dreams, which emphasized dreams as valuable access points to the unconscious mind. By contrast, Descartes' method seeks certainty in knowledge and the assurance of rational thought, even in the face of skepticism.