Question

I shall add that the conception of change, and with it the conception of motion, as change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time; that if this representation were not an intuition (internal) a priori, no conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the same thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing, that is, after each other.

Answer 1

The conception of change, including the idea of motion as a change of place, is only possible through and in the representation of time.

If the representation of time were not an intuition (internal) a priori, no conception could make the possibility of change comprehensible.

The representation of time allows for the conjunction of contradictorily opposed predicates in one object, such as the presence and non-presence of a thing in the same place.

Two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing are only possible in time, occurring after each other.

Step-by-step explanation:

The statement emphasizes that the idea of change, specifically motion as a change of place, relies on the representation of time. This aligns with the question's content, linking the conception of motion to the representation of time.

The use of "intuition (internal) a priori" indicates that the representation of time is inherent and not derived from experience, supporting the idea that it is a fundamental concept for understanding change.

The statement explains that time allows contradictory predicates (presence and non-presence) to coexist in one object. This corresponds to the question's focus on the possibility of contradictory determinations.

The conclusion underscores that two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing occur in time and sequentially after each other, reinforcing the temporal aspect of conceptualizing change.

The provided text delves into the philosophical underpinnings of how the conception of change, particularly motion, is intricately tied to the representation of time as an a priori intuition. It elucidates how contradictory determinations find coherence in the temporal framework.