Question

In discussions related to Pascal’s wager, which I’m hoping most of you are familiar with, one of the objections against it is to simply refuse to assign a probability to God’s existence. The argument is that in a state of complete epistemic nullity, any probability assignment would be meaningless. See article here

But why should a refusal to assign a probability imply epistemic nullity? What if one thinks there are good reasons to not believe in God and refuse to assign a probability to it anyways due to the meaninglessness of probability here? How would one put a "measure" to this?

Answer 1

Refusing to assign probability to God's existence in the context of Pascal's 'Wager' reflects a belief that probabilistic reasoning is not applicable to such a metaphysical question.

Step-by-step explanation:

Refusing to assign a probability to the existence of God within the context of Pascal's wager does not necessarily imply epistemic nullity, but it may reflect a view that the concept of probability is not applicable or meaningful in this context. Assigning a measure of probability requires a basis upon which to make such a calculation, but when assessing the existence of a deity, especially one that may transcend human understanding, it can be argued that such a basis is inherently lacking or imprecise. This stance could also stem from a philosophical position that accepts strong reasons for non-belief in God that go beyond the purview of probabilistic reasoning.

Blaise Pascal's "Wager" itself is a pragmatic argument for belief in God, appealing to human emotions and involving a cost-benefit analysis of believing versus not believing, where belief is incentivized by the potential for infinite gain or avoidance of infinite loss. However, this wager faces the problem of the "Many Gods," where uncertainty about which deity to believe in undermines the wager's simplicity. Moreover, skeptics might argue that ethical decisions and beliefs should not be based on mere pragmatic considerations but rather on evidence and reason.