Question

Natural kinds are kinds that correspond to a grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world rather than the interests and actions of human beings. But for a kind or grouping to exist, the constituents of that grouping must be similar to each other in some way. Goodman showed that similarity is likely a vacuous concept and is context dependent by its very nature. "A is similar to B" or even "A is similar to B with respect to X" can be rephrased as "A and B both are C with respect to X." This seems to get rid of the term entirely. Now, given that what attribute of X one chooses to compare between A and B seems context dependent and arbitrary, how can there possibly be any kinds that are independent of human interest/motivation? Lastly, aren’t all abstract objects not directly part of the natural world? So how can there be "natural" kinds anyways?

Answer 1

Natural kinds reflect fundamental groupings in the natural world, beyond human interests. Despite the debate over the concept of similarity, natural kinds are thought to possess inherent natural structures. The philosophical discussion includes arguments on natural laws and rights, as well as differing views on whether abstract concepts can have a natural basis.

Step-by-step explanation:

Understanding natural kinds and the debate around similarity as a concept requires recognizing that while similarity may be context-dependent, natural kinds are posited as groupings in the natural world that are not arbitrarily defined but reflect fundamental similarities that exist regardless of human perception or interests. For instance, Linnaeus's attempt at classification, while not perfect, aimed to capture these natural groupings. While the identification of these kinds might indeed be influenced by the contexts in which they are observed, proponents of natural kinds argue that there are underlying structures and characteristics in the natural world that make these kinds natural.

Moreover, natural kinds are not restricted to physical entities; abstract concepts like moral goodness can also be argued to have a natural basis, as seen in Natural Goodness by Philippa Foot, who compares moral evaluations to natural evaluations made in other aspects of the natural world. In discussions of natural rights and laws, figures like Locke argue for a law of nature that governs ethics, while Bentham rejects this, highlighting the philosophical debate about the nature of such rights and laws.

Naturalism offers an empirical approach, validating only what can be observed or tested in the physical realm, but even this is contentious and does not fully account for the complexities of abstract concepts and morality as parts of 'natural kinds.' Acknowledging this complexity is essential in understanding the possible existence of natural kinds, which may extend beyond just physical entities.