Question

A third problem, one of Russell’s objections to Meinongianism (see [Russell 1905a, 1907]), turns on the fact that existence is, on Meinongianism, a property and hence figures into the base of the naive comprehension principle. So, consider the condition of being winged, being a horse, and existing. By the naive comprehension principle, there is an object with exactly these features. But then this object exists, as existing is one of its characterizing features. Intuitively, however, there is no existent winged horse. An existent object cannot so easily be thought into being. Indeed, for every intuitively nonexistent object that motivates Meinongianism—Zeus, Pegasus, Santa Clause, and Ronald McDonald—there is, by the naive abstraction principle, an object just like it but with the additional property of existing. But then there is an existing Zeus, an existing Pegasus, etc.. This is overpopulation not of being but of existence as well.

So suppose we use the encoding/exemplifying distinction. Shouldn't we be able to encode an object for the predicate exemplifies something, just like we can encode something per exists? If this is not enough to recapitulate Russell's objection, what about encoding an object as encodes exemplifying something? And then encodes encoding exemplifying something, etc.?

Or, then, can we show that any attempt to adjust our theory of predication to accommodate these pairs of existence-like predicates will fail once taken to its second- or maybe third-order? E.g., can we not stipulate that there is a Meinongian object for, A cleverly disguised shrimp with a property that is both the bare existence property and a nuclear property? The nuclear/extranuclear distinction is supposed to block that by making such a property into a contradiction, which is nullified from the system. However, for a (neo-)Meinongian, is it not possible that there is an impossible object with the property of being a violator of the nuclear/extranuclear distinction, or more classically-speaking being such that its nuclear properties are its extranuclear properties (c.f. Russell's paradox, and the motives behind his theory of types)?P

Answer 1

This question pertains to Bertrand Russell's critique of Meinongianism and its treatment of existence as a property, aligning with Kant's position that existence is not a predicate. Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and propositional knowledge is also relevant to the discussion, as it highlights the mediation of sense data in our understanding of existence.

Step-by-step explanation:

The question revolves around Russell's critique of Meinongianism, which suggests that existence is a property and hence figures into the naive comprehension principle leading to a paradox of nonexistent entities like winged horses becoming existent just by their conceptual properties.

Russell's concern aligns with Immanuel Kant's criticism of the ontological argument that existence cannot be a predicate; thus, one cannot confer existence onto an entity merely by including it within the idea of that thing.

Meinongian objects revolve around the idea that there is an object for every property, including those that defy logical norms such as the nuclear/extranuclear distinction. However, this leads to contradictions similar to those found in Russell's paradox, suggesting that any theory of predication that tries to accommodate existence-like predicates will ultimately fail when extended beyond its initial order.

In epistemology, Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and propositional knowledge underscores our reliance on inference rather than direct awareness of external objects. This distinction is essential to understanding how we interpret sense data and infer substantive propositions about the external world.