Question

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events.

Many of the challenges to this view revolve around how it reduces us to nothing more than machines and goes against our experience of free will.

But do we actually experience free will? Actions come from decisions which are thoughts. But when do we choose our thoughts? It is not as if there is a basket of thoughts among which we pick one out of. Thoughts, instead, seem to pop out of nowhere as many careful meditators have claimed. Sam Harris argues that the entire concept is incoherent.

Some argue that free will is a fundamental component of experience. But if it was a fundamental component of experience, how could it even be doubted? We may not be able to doubt that we experience, but there is nothing preventing us from doubting that we experience free will. Lastly, it is not hard to imagine conscious experience without free will.

So if free will is not experienced, can this be evidence for epiphenomenalism?

Answer 1

Epiphenomenalism suggests mental events do not cause physical events, casting doubt on free will, which conflicts with our sense of agency. Neuroscience supports this view showing decisions may be pre-determined by brain activity, aligning with the physicalist view that reduces the mind to brain processes.

Step-by-step explanation:

Epiphenomenalism posits that mental events are the result of physical processes in the brain yet do not influence subsequent physical events, thereby framing the mind as a byproduct without causal power. The experience of free will is often cited against epiphenomenalism; however, even direct experiences may be misleading or not indicative of actual mechanisms of decision-making.

Subjects like neuroscience and philosophical arguments around determinism challenge the notion that we have free will. Studies such as those by Benjamin Libet suggest that our sense of having made a decision may arise after unconscious brain activity has already set the decision in motion. The notion of the physicalist view of the mind further strips away at dualism by reducing mental activities to purely physical processes of the brain, in line with monism-materialism and challenging the need for non-physical entities.

Free will's existence and its place in our conscious experience are heavily debated in philosophy. If free will cannot be directly experienced or is subject to doubt, epiphenomenalism could gain ground, suggesting that perhaps our sensations of making choices are illusory and not evidence of actual influence on physical events. This relates to significant philosophical debates such as those between compatibilists and incompatibilists, and ultimately touches on deep questions about human agency, responsibility, and the nature of consciousness itself.