Final answer:
Deontologists like Kant argue that consequences are irrelevant to moral assessment because they believe that morality is rooted in duty and motives rather than outcomes. Kant emphasizes the intrinsic value of good will and adherence to the Categorical Imperative. Later deontologists, such as W.D. Ross, acknowledge that consequences might inform how duties are prioritized but maintain that duty is central to moral judgments.
Step-by-step explanation:
Why Deontologists Like Kant Dismiss Consequences in Moral Judgments
Deontologists such as Immanuel Kant argue that consequences are not morally relevant because they believe the morality of an action is determined by one's adherence to duty or moral law, rather than the outcomes produced by the action. Unlike utilitarians, who assess the rightness of actions by their consequences, deontologists hold that the rightness of an action comes from its conformity with moral duties that have intrinsic value. Kant in particular posited that only good will—the intention to perform one's duty for its own sake—has unconditional value. The moral value of an action, thus, lies in the motive behind it, driven by what he calls the Categorical Imperative, a set of principles that applies universally and unconditionally.
According to Kant, actions carried out from a sense of good will are of moral worth, irrespective of their outcomes. This radically differs from consequentialist views, such as utilitarianism, where the morality of an action is judged solely on its results. Kant's approach emphasizes that actions should be done from a sense of duty, and not because of any forecasted benefit, this marks a significant divergence from the consequentialist focus on outcome maximization.
The late deontologist W.D. Ross, while influenced by Kant, argued that one must consider prima facie duties—duties that are binding unless overridden by more pressing duties—in moral decision making. Although he agreed that duty plays a critical role in moral judgments, he also acknowledged that consequences could inform the weight and priority of such duties, thereby softening the strict Kantian stance by integrating a pluralistic view of moral obligations.