Question

In the context of deontic logic, particularly concerning the concept of agglomeration and its implications for moral dilemmas, does the agglomeration principle apply universally to all deontic operators (such as obligation, permission, prohibition, and supererogation)? If so, how does the notion of agglomeration align with the logical implications derived from the principles of 'ought implies can' and the possibility of simultaneous compatibility of separate permissions or prohibitions? Alternatively, are there exceptions or instances where agglomeration breaks down or fails to hold true, especially when considering incompatible actions or moral choices that cannot be executed concurrently?

Answer 1

The principle of agglomeration in deontic logic applies to various deontic operators, but its universality is challenged when obligations may not be possible to perform concurrently due to their incompatibility. Thinkers like W. D. Ross highlight the role of competing duties and consequences, demonstrating limitations of strict agglomeration.

Step-by-step explanation:

Deontic Logic and Agglomeration

In deontic logic, the principle of agglomeration stipulates that if separate duties are obligatory, then their combination should also be obligatory. This principle typically applies to deontic operators such as obligation, permission, prohibition, and supererogation. However, in consideration of the principle 'ought implies can,' which asserts that for an action to be obligatory it must also be possible to perform, agglomeration can encounter issues. Specifically, if duties are incompatible or cannot be executed concurrently, agglomeration would not hold, as combining two actions that cannot both be performed would violate the 'ought implies can' principle.

For instance, moral dilemmas can arise when there are competing duties that cannot be satisfied at the same time, demonstrating the limitations of applying agglomeration universally. Deontological theories, as illustrated by thinkers such as W. D. Ross, acknowledge this complexity and consider the consequences and moral relevance of duties rather than adhering strictly to universal rules. This nuanced perspective recognizes that moral obligations may not always align neatly and that there can be exceptions to agglomeration when considering the practicality of moral choices.

Therefore, while the idea of agglomeration is a significant component in deontic logic, its application is not universal and requires an evaluation of the specific context to determine whether all obligations and permissions can legitimately be agglomerated.