Question

Qualified Speciesism claims that a specific characteristic or property of humans marks a morally relevant difference between humans and animals, to the effect that some actions involving animals will be morally justified while the same actions involving humans will not be morally justified, because of the specific characteristic. Suppose that your opponent identifies rationality as the specific, morally relevant characteristic for qualified speciesism. Furthermore, suppose that you accept the theory of Moral Individualism. (We are not assuming here that one view is necessarily correct, but that both you and your opponent are committed to your views.) What should be your response, from the Moral Individualist framework, to Qualified Speciesism?

A) Accept rationality as morally relevant
B) Reject rationality as morally relevant
C) Modify Moral Individualism
D) Challenge the entire framework

Answer 1

A Moral Individualist would likely reject the notion of rationality as the sole determinant of moral status, as per Qualified Speciesism, and instead promote a broader view of moral consideration including sentience and agency among both humans and non-humans.

Step-by-step explanation:

From the perspective of Moral Individualism, a response to Qualified Speciesism, which suggests rationality as a morally relevant characteristic distinguishing humans from animals, would likely involve questioning the basis on which rationality is deemed sufficient for assigning moral status. Moral Individualism emphasizes the moral consideration of individuals based on their own characteristics, rather than based on their species membership. It would thus challenge us to consider whether every human, irrespective of their current level of rationality, warrants moral consideration and whether some non-humans with significant levels of rationality or sentience should also warrant similar consideration. The Moral Individualism framework would thus likely reject rationality as the sole morally relevant characteristic and invite a more nuanced approach to moral status.

As the arguments suggest, personhood and moral worth cannot be solely tied to one's current ability to function as a rational agent. This perspective would extend moral considerations to humans who may not have fully developed rational capacities, such as children, as well as potentially to non-human entities that might possess significant levels of sentience or attributes otherwise deemed valuable. The theory points out that potential capacities or being a member of a species should not be the only basis for moral consideration.

In light of these points, a response from a Moral Individualist might be to argue that such a complex issue requires a more thoughtful consideration that looks beyond just human rationality and includes a broader sense of sentience, agency, and the potential for suffering among various entities, rather than only including human beings.