Final answer:
The main resistance to the argument from evil lies in the theistic claim that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, such as free will and the achievement of greater goods. Philosophers like David Hume have argued against the compatibility of deity's omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence with the existence of evil.
Step-by-step explanation:
The main source of resistance to the argument from evil is the claim that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the existence of evil, which may include the development of free will, soul-making, or some greater good that humans may not understand.
To tackle the problem of evil, philosophers differentiate between logical and evidential versions. The logical problem of evil, as famously discussed by David Hume, contends that the existence of an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent deity is incompatible with the existence of evil.
If such a deity exists, then evil should not. On the other hand, the evidential problem of evil posits that the sheer amount and intensity of evil provide evidence against the likelihood of such a deity's existence.
Defenders of theism may suggest that evil is a result of human error stemming from free will. Without free will, humans would lack the autonomy to choose good over evil, effectively rendering them 'robots.' Furthermore, these defenders often propose that the potential for evil is a necessary component for greater goods, such as character development or the exercise of virtue.
Others may argue that some evil contributes mysteriously to an overall better universe or that we are not in a position to understand the full moral landscape in which God operates.
Additionally, arguments such as Leibniz’s response suggest that even if there is more perceived evil than good, this does not mean that the overall 'work of God'—which may include an immeasurable number of beings—is not ultimately good or even the best possible world.
However, objections to these defenses arise by questioning the need for an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being to create a world with the possibility of such evils, especially when considering instances of gratuitous evils or immense natural disasters, which might seem to serve no evident purpose or greater good.
The concept of a deity may subtly shift from an all-perfect being to one with limitations, which itself might seem to contradict the initial attributes ascribed to the deity.