Final answer:
Moral realism claims that there are objective moral truths while moral skeptics argue that values are inherently subjective. The debate questions whether values can be objective like facts, with philosophers such as Hilary Putnam suggesting that even scientific practices incorporate evaluative judgments. This discourse explores the relation between facts and values, crucial to both ethics and metaethics.
Step-by-step explanation:
Moral Realism and the Fact-Value Distinction
Moral realism is the philosophical position that proposes the existence of moral facts which are objective and independent of human feelings or societal beliefs. It holds that certain actions are morally right or wrong, regardless of individual perspectives or cultural diversity. As such, moral realism requires a foundational basis for ethical concepts, which might be derived from various sources such as divine command, natural law, or inherent human rights.
However, the challenge to moral realism lies in connecting these objective moral truths with empirical facts about the world. Critics, or moral skeptics, argue that values cannot simply be deduced from facts, as they belong to different categories of understanding. They contend that while facts are descriptive and can be scientifically verified, values are prescriptive and inherently subjective. This debate reveals itself in multiple areas of ethics and metaethics, influencing our understanding of the ontology of value.
One notable philosopher, Hilary Putnam, questioned the fact-value dichotomy by suggesting that even in the realm of science, which is externally regarded as fact-driven, value judgments play a role in theory selection and the establishment of what is accepted as 'fact.' As a case in point, he illustrated that Einstein's theory of gravity was favored not only because of empirical evidence but also due to its simplicity and coherence with established laws, indicating an evaluative element in scientific practices.