Final answer:
WT. Stace argues for Compatibilist free will by stating that free will is compatible with determinism and that the question of free will is separate from causal determinism. He distinguishes between free and unfree actions based on whether they are externally constrained or impeded, and argues that as long as we have the ability to make choices and act according to our own values and desires, our actions can be considered free.
Step-by-step explanation:
WT. Stace's argument for Compatibilist free will is based on the idea that free will is compatible with determinism. He believes that the question of free will has nothing to do with causal determinism because even if our actions are determined by prior causes, we can still have the ability to make choices and act according to our desires and values.
Stace distinguishes between free and unfree actions by considering whether an action is externally constrained or impeded. He argues that if an action is not externally constrained or impeded, it can be considered a free action, even if it is causally determined.
Stace makes his distinction in this way by asserting that the kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility is some kind of freedom of choice or freedom of deliberation. As long as we have the ability to make choices and act in accordance with our own values and desires, our actions can be considered free, even if they are determined by prior causes.