Final answer:
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) holds that one is morally responsible if they could have acted differently, which is challenged by the incompatibilist view asserting the exclusivity of free will and determinism. Frankfurt's objection shifts the focus from alternative possibilities to fulfilling one's desires and volitions, offering a different perspective on freedom and moral responsibility. Criticism against PAP involves scrutiny of our physical constraints and social conditioning.
Step-by-step explanation:
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) suggests that a person is morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. In the realm of philosophical discussions on free will and determinism, incompatibilism posits that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive. Regarding the consequences argument, it is suggested that if determinism is true, then our actions are the result of laws of nature and antecedent conditions, implying that alternative possibilities do not exist, thereby supporting the notion of incompatibility between determinism and free will.
Frankfurt's objection to PAP suggests that freedom can be understood not as the ability to do otherwise, but as the ability to do what one wants, considering one's first-order and second-order volitions. Nonetheless, libertarianism and certain incompatibilist perspectives rely heavily on PAP, contending that moral responsibility requires that we could have acted differently.
Moreover, arguments against PAP involve physical determinism, suggesting that our actions are constrained by physical laws, and social determinism, which points out that social norms condition our choices. However, Frankfurt's perspective and other compatibilist stances argue that moral responsibility may be preserved even under deterministic conditions, by redefining freedom to align with fulfilling one's volitions and desires.