Final answer:
The equilibrium value of employment and the real wage in a labor market influenced by both a union and a monopsony cannot be precisely determined from the information provided. The actual values depend on the relative bargaining powers of the union and monopsonist, with wages and employment levels .
Step-by-step explanation:
The question pertains to determining the equilibrium value of employment and the real wage in a particular market. However, based on the information provided, these values can't be directly calculated due to the indeterminacy caused by the interaction between a union's and a monopsony's influence on the labor market.
In the context of the question, the scenario describes a labor market where the equilibrium wage is indeterminate and may fall anywhere between the wage a union (Wu) would prefer and that which a monopsony (Wm) would aim for. This wage indeterminacy occurs because each party wants to manipulate employment and wages to their advantage, with a union seeking higher wages and a monopsony aiming for lower wages and employment levels.
Furthermore, when analyzing the figures mentioned, we understand that in such a labor market with monopsony and union presence, the employment will likely be lower than in a competitive labor market due to the conflicting goals of both parties regarding employment levels. The actual wage that will be set in this market is uncertain and will depend on the relative bargaining power of the union and the monopsonist.
Monopsony power would lead to wages closer to Wm, whereas stronger union bargaining power would result in wages closer to Wu. The extent to which either has power dictates how close the wage will be to either extremity.