Question

The threat of a strike seems to encourage voluntary settlement efforts at the bargaining table while the availability of interest arbitration may reduce such incentive producing a "chilling effect" on negotiations.

a. True
b. False

Answer 1

The statement that the possibility of a strike can drive voluntary settlements, while accessibility to interest arbitration might reduce this incentive, is true. The threat of a strike can encourage proactive negotiations to avoid the consequences of work stoppages.

Step-by-step explanation:

The statement that the threat of a strike encourages voluntary settlement efforts at the bargaining table, while the availability of interest arbitration may reduce such incentives, thereby producing a "chilling effect" on negotiations, is true. In labor relations, the potential of a strike acts as a powerful catalyst for both parties to reach an agreement. Strikes can inflict significant financial damage and disrupt production, so employers may seek to avert them through compromises.

Conversely, interest arbitration can sometimes have a deterrent effect on reaching a voluntary settlement, as parties might rely on the decision of an arbitrator instead of actively negotiating a mutually beneficial agreement. Historical instances such as the 1902 Anthracite Coal Strike highlight the effectiveness of arbitration in resolving disputes, but it also underscores the critical role that the threat of strikes plays in motivating parties to negotiate.