Final answer:
Mutually Assured Destruction during the Cold War can be seen as a game akin to the Chicken Game or deterrence game in game theory because it is based on the notion that escalation by one player would lead to mutual destruction, thereby deterring both from doing so.
Step-by-step explanation:
During the Cold War, the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) observed by the United States and the Soviet Union can be characterized as a type of game in the realm of game theory. Specifically, it is akin to a Chicken Game or a variant of deterrence game, where two players (or nations) choose either to escalate or de-escalate a potential conflict with the understanding that mutual escalation leads to the worst possible outcome for both - in this case, nuclear annihilation.
The essence of MAD is based on the possession of nuclear arsenals capable of causing unimaginable destruction, which serves as a deterrent against nuclear aggression. If one side attacked, the other would retaliate with equal or greater force, ensuring mutual destruction. This standoff relies on rational actors, who would logically refrain from initiating an attack to avoid catastrophic consequences, thus preventing the outbreak of nuclear war.
The Cold War era's strategy of deterrence through building up immense retaliatory capabilities, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear warheads, was employed by both the US and USSR, driven by a fear that plunging into a nuclear war would not yield any victors, only mutual devastation.